The doctrine of karma has been praised as a rational and morally edifying explanatory response to the existence of evil and apparent injustice in the world. Critics have attacked it as a morally misguided dogma that distorts one's vision of reality. This essay, after outlining the traditional doctrine, examines three criticisms that have been central to recent debates:
Introduction
'Karma doctrine transformed the world into a strictly rational, ethically-determined cosmos; it represents the most consistent theodicy ever produced by history.' So wrote Max Weber in
The Religion of India, first published in 1916. 1 Since the law of karma is often assumed to operate independently or at least semi-independently of a supreme deity, some would question the aptness of the term 'theodicy' in this context, opting instead for an alternative such as 'Cosmodicy' (Huxley 1947: 68) , 'anthropodicy' (Larson 2003Ś 254-5) or 'karmadicy' (Herman 1987) ; but the idea that the doctrine of karma constitutes an impressive response to the existence of evil in the world has been widely endorsed. 2 
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Whether this doctrine has been a blessing or a curse to those religions that have adopted it, however, remains a vexed question. Some commentators have lauded it as 'a doctrine of hope' due to the prospect of eventual moral and spiritual perfection that it is deemed to promote (Yamunacharya 1967: 72) ; 3 others have dubbed it 'a philosophy of despair' due to its purportedly fatalistic implications (Kuppuswamy 1977: 46) . 4 Some find it to be morally 'comforting', 'soothing' and 'satisfying' (Wadia 1965) as well as an intellectually satisfactory -'or rather, the least unsatisfactory' -solution to the problem of evil (Nayak 1993: 146, 182 ); 5 others condemn it as either 'completely vacuous as a principle of moral guidance' (Edwards 1996Ś 42) or as the playing of 'a cruel joke on the credulity of the masses' (Kuppuswamy 1977Ś 47) , 'a convenient tool for explaining away the perceived inequality in human society' (Ramendra 2011Ś 56) .
This essay will critically examine some recent debates concerning the morality of belief in karma and in the closely allied notion of rebirth or reincarnation. To make sense of these debates it will first be necessary to offer some remarks on the nature of the karma doctrine itself and its place within South Asian religious traditions (section 2). Then will ensue discussion of three serious charges recently brought against the doctrine: namely, that it is morally vacuous (section 3), that it involves an irresolvable dilemma concerning moral agency (section 4), and that it cruelly blames victims for their own afflictions (section 5).
Possible responses will be considered along the way, and (in section 6) attention will be given both to the depth of basic moral disagreement that often divides opponents in debates over karma and to the scope that exists for divergent ways of articulating karma-related beliefs, especially with regard to whether those articulations are self-or other-directed. In conclusion (section 7) I will propose that the doctrine of karma is not well conceived as a theoretical product of inductive (or, as one critic has put it, 'counter-inductive') reasoningś it is better 3 envisaged, at least for the most part, as a constitutive element in a worldview within which believers seek to make sense of the suffering and contingencies of life.
The Doctrine of Karma
Deriving from the verbal root k ('to do, make, perform, accomplish ...'), karma is the nominative singular form of the Sanskrit noun karman. 6 In its widest sense 'it means any act, intentional or unintentional, moral or amoral' (Pandeya 1967Ś 98) ś but in the context of what has come to be known as the doctrine of karma it denotes a morally evaluable action plus the potential or power of that action to bring about a particular result or consequence, which is liable to come to fruition some time after the commission of the action itself, perhaps in a future life (Krishan 1997: 4) . Crucially, the consequences that are most pertinent here are ones that bear upon the experience or well-being of the agent herself. As an early Buddhist scripture puts itŚ 'By you ... has the seed been sownś Thus you will experience the fruit' (Bodhi 2000: 328) . 7 Scholarly opinion on the origins of the karma doctrine is divided. While it is generally agreed that its earliest formulations occur in some of the oldest Upanishads, there remains considerable dispute both over the antiquity of these texts and over the question whether the doctrine evolved within Vedic Brahmanism itself or, alternatively, was appropriated from cultural groups located towards the eastern region of the Gangetic plain -the region from which Buddhism, Jainism and the now defunct j vikas hailed. 8 Fortunately, for the purposes of this essay it will not be necessary to resolve these complex historical matters.
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In Buddhist traditions, karma (or its P li equivalent, kamma) is often explicitly understood to encompass the intention behind or volition with which the action is performed;
hence it has been defined as 'volition and that which is effected by it' (Abhidharmako a 4.1, quoted in Griffiths 1982: 281) . 10 Thus the emphasis is placed on its being voluntary actions 4 that generate 'merit' or 'demerit' for the agent (Arnold 2012Ś 31) , with the perhaps somewhat crude analogy of a 'bank account of karma' often being invoked to convey this idea ).
Schools of classical Indian philosophy have developed more or less sophisticated models of the psychological processes that characterize the relations between karma, rebirth and spiritual fulfilment. For instance, the school of Yoga associated with Patañjali (c. third-fourth century CE) speaks of our ordinary actions being rooted in particular forms of ignorance; these actions generate psychological impressions and traces, the accumulation of which determines the type and duration of one's next life along with the modes of experience one will undergo (Bryant 2009: 198-202) . Though different schools have their own nuanced systems of doctrine and practice, Yoga shares with other Brahmanical branches of Indian philosophy, as well as with Buddhism and Jainism, a concern with liberation from sa s ra (the cycle of rebirth). Both Yoga and Buddhism maintain that progress can be made towards this goal in the short to medium term by maximizing virtuous actions and minimizing vicious ones; the longer-term objective, however, is to eradicate the 'root' of ignorance and to thereby remove the source of all further action and tainted experience. This requires sustained meditative discipline and the cultivation of non-attachment to worldly phenomena (Bryant 2009: 47-8; Burley 2007: 130-1) .
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Since rebirth traditions deriving from South Asia hold the fructifying of merit in pleasant and of demerit in unpleasant experience to be an operation built into the very structure of the universe, the phrase law of karma has commonly been used to denote it (Lopez 2008: 21-2) .
Like Kant (1956: 166) , a proponent of the karma doctrine would be apt to identify both 'the starry heavens above' and 'the moral law within' as strictly law-governed. Unlike Kant, however, such a proponent would not be apt to draw a sharp distinction between moral and natural law. Psychology and cosmology tend to blur together in the South Asian rebirth 5 traditions, with the concept of dharma being a capacious principle that encompasses both right action and the orderly functioning of the universe as a whole (Koller 1972) .
Although there has historically been a strong conceptual link between karma and rebirth, 12 the two concepts ought not to be conflated, for there exist beyond South Asia numerous forms of belief in rebirth that make no reference to karma. 13 Moreover, it has been observed that among Hindus and Buddhists there is a growing tendency to regard karma as operating within a single lifetime instead of over several lives. 14 Some scholars have characterized this tendency in terms of 'demythologization'; that is, an attempt to make the doctrine more consistent with a modern scientific worldview, according to which the idea of a soul or causally connected 'stream of consciousness' undergoing a succession of lives is, at best, highly suspect and, at worst, incoherent. 15 It is beyond the scope of this essay to give a detailed account of the multiple competing interpretations of karma and rebirth that have been developed both historically and in the contemporary world. However, the fact that there is not just one commonly agreed upon version of the doctrine will become relevant at certain stages of my discussion below, which will focus on some recent controversies over the doctrine's moral implications.
Moral Vacuity?
It is often assumed that believing in karma brings with it normative implications for how one ought to act. Some claim that these implications are laudable: the belief gives one a reason to behave virtuously, knowing that immoral behaviour leads to future suffering. Others declare the implications to be baleful: one will have a justification for neglecting the misfortunes of others, presuming them to be the natural consequences of past sins on the sufferer's part. Paul
Edwards, however, has argued that the doctrine of karma provides no guidance for action whatsoever: although it does, he maintains, have ramifications for our attitudes towards 6 victims of suffering (ramifications that will be discussed in section 5 below), it is devoid of any practical significance. This is because, given a certain essential feature of belief in karma, it turns out that absolutely anything one does must be presumed to be the 'right thing' to do (Edwards 1996: 42-3) .
The essential feature in question is the belief in universal justice -the idea that, notwithstanding any appearances to the contrary, the world is in the final analysis a perfectly just place. 16 If one holds this as a non-negotiable, or categorical, assumption, then it follows, Edwards maintains, that regardless of what eventuates, and hence regardless of whether we assist those who are in need (or whether our efforts to do so are successful), 'the ultimate outcome will be just, in the sense that every human being will be getting exactly -no more and no less -what he deserves ' (1996: 43) . The problem that this belief generates can be illustrated by an example. We might imagine a soldier on a battlefield -let us call him Arjuna -who is perplexed about whether to take part in the imminent fight between feuding cousins. 17 Should he participate, and thus run the risk of having his kinsmen's blood on his hands, or should he refrain, thereby foregoing his duty as a warrior? If one assumes that universal justice obtains, it hardly seems to matter what he does. If he slaughters his cousins, then it must be the case that they 'deserved' to die. If, on the other hand, he lays down his weapon and is himself slain, then this must be what justice demands. Necessarily, whatever happens, it must be right; and hence, it seems, the decision is arbitrary. Morality is abolished.
Many would call this view 'fatalism'. But Edwards is willing to concede to the believer in universal justice that it need not be fatalistic (1996: 42-3) . By this, Edwards means that universal justice need not preclude human freedom. To return to my example, it could be that Arjuna has a genuine choice, that whether he charges into battle or retreats to the sidelines is, in some meaningful sense, up to him. 18 To say that he has no choice in the matter would, on
Edwards' view, be fatalistic. But the believer in a supremely just world need not say this; 7 instead, she can say that, despite its being ultimately up to Arjuna what he does, whichever decision he makes will turn out to be in perfect accordance with justice. Whether there really is room for a conceptual distinction between fatalism and this whatever-happens-is-just view remains contentious, however.
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Francis Story offers an instructive real-life example that is germane to the present issue.
He cites the case of a doctor who specializes in pulmonary diseases and is also a Buddhist.
While acknowledging the carcinogenic effects of smoking, the doctor himself remains 'a fairly heavy cigarette smoker', remarking that even if '[a]ll the physical causes of cancer' are present, cancer will develop only if the individual's karma is 'also a predisposing factor' (Story 2000: 45) . Is this a fatalistic attitude? Talk of 'predispositions' and 'physical causes'
implies that karma is not perceived as fully determining whether one contracts cancer, and yet the doctor's apparent sanguinity about his own habit implies that he supposes karma to play the major role. Even with this latter point in view, however, it does not look as though the doctor's attitude is fatalistic in a strictly deterministic sense of that term, which seems to be the sense that Edwards is privileging when he concedes that belief in karma need not be fatalistic. But the case is complicated, and we should not of course rule out the possibility of some degree of incoherence or self-deception on the doctor's part.
A believer with a more 'totalizing' conception of karma's operations may admit that,
were the doctor to contract cancer, it is his heavy smoking that would be the primary causal factor, while adding that it is the doctor's karma that is responsible for his smoking in the first place; that is, were it not for certain bad deeds performed by him in the past (including in previous lives), the doctor would not have suffered the misfortune of taking up the habit.
Such a view of karma's role starts to sound far more deterministic, as it may be construed as implying that it is not only the outcomes of certain of our decisions that are karmicly determined, but the decisions themselves. Further complications are present in the case of an 8 activity such as smoking, whose strongly addictive character may preclude its being straightforwardly described as freely chosen on anyone's account. 20 But if we return again to Arjuna on the battlefield, it looks as though the proponent of the totalizing conception is liable to say that his 'decision' whether or not to fight is itself the outcome of past karma -it is just part of an ongoing mechanistic process within which we are all mere instruments rather than free agents.
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Despite Edwards' concession to the believer in karma, other commentators have been less willing to distinguish belief in universal justice from fatalism (where 'fatalism' is construed in a strictly deterministic sense). One recent critic of the moral value and coherence of the belief has presented the problem facing the believer in terms of a dilemma, which I shall discuss in the next section.
A Karmic Dilemma?
As we have seen, Edwards' complaint about the karma doctrine is that it lacks any capacity for moral guidance: since, on the assumption that the universe is inherently just, any practically achievable outcome would itself be just, what ordinarily appear to us as morally serious decisions are in fact arbitrary. This arbitrariness would be a disastrous result for advocates of karma, who vaunt its morally edifying potential. Further difficulties for the view that karma offers a viable response to the problem of evil have been raised in recent work by Whitley Kaufman (2005 Kaufman ( , 2007 . One of these difficulties takes the form of a dilemma, one horn of which bears a close resemblance to Edwards' charge of moral vacuity.
The dilemma concerns what Kaufman sees as an irresolvable tension between universal justice and free will. If one believes in universal justice, then one believes that everything that happens (or, we might say, everything that happens which has any moral significance) is morally just; in effect, there is no moral evil, because any putative 'victims' of apparently 9 evil acts must have received only what they deserved. The one who performs the act cannot be blameworthyŚ she is an instrument of karmic law, like 'the executioner who delivers the lethal injection' (Kaufman 2005Ś 25) -or, if we take the metaphor of an 'instrument' more strictly, like the syringe through which the lethal injection is administered. And yet the very idea of desert presupposes the possibility of free agency. Without it, moral responsibility would be eliminated, and then no one would be deserving of praise or blame: apparently moral judgements would have become vacuous. So belief in universal justice -and hence in the law of karma -seems both to require belief in free moral agency and to obviate it.
One way of responding to a dilemma of the sort just outlined would be to protest that it relies on an artificial philosophical reconstruction of belief in karma as opposed to a faithful account of how the belief manifests in the everyday lives of those who hold it. While it is undoubtedly true that some philosophical defenders of the so-called 'theory' of karma seek to portray it as 'logical' or 'scientific', in contrast with what they see as mere religious dogmas such as the idea of God's providential will, 22 it may well be the case that such would-be apologists are attempting to defend a chimera. And if that is so, then the 'theory' attacked by the philosophical enemies of karma may be a chimera too.
Kaufman openly admits that what he is criticizing is really 'a simplified, idealized version
of the karma-and-rebirth doctrine, one abstracted as far as possible from particular historical or doctrinal questions ' (2005Ś 16) . He is right to point this out, for if we attend to the lives of believers in karma, we are apt to witness a frequent intermingling of other beliefs: beliefs, for example, concerning the capacity of gods or spirits to intervene on one's behalf if propitiated, to unleash their ire if angered, or to affect the course of one's life by their capricious or mischievous games. 23 We will also discover a multiplicity of forms that the belief in karma itself can take. As one sceptical commentator remarksŚ 'Whether the celebrated law of Karma ruling the universe is deterministic and causal or probabilistic, essentially retributive or 10 essentially reformative, basically moral or metaphysical, seems open to serious dispute' (Chari 1967: 128) . 24 Some varieties of the belief include, for instance, ideas not only of crossspecies rebirth but also of salvation being directly achievable 'by birds, animals, reptiles, insects and even plants' (Meenakshisundaram 1967Ś 26) . Others regard this as an absurdity, and maintain, moreover, that talk of 'an evil-doer [being] reborn as an animal' can mean only 'that there will be a predominant degree of animality in that human form' (Sastri 1967Ś 118). Whatever we think about the critical reach of Kaufman's claim that a systematized version of karma faces a crippling dilemma, there is another, even more emphatically moral, objection to karma that surely does find purchase against the doctrine in some of its everyday as well as its more systematized forms. The objection is that the belief in karma, at least in its 11 retributive varieties, involves an odious mode of 'blaming the victim', and it is to this objection that I shall now turn.
Blaming Victims?
From time to time believers in karma come out with statements that strike those who do not share their belief (and perhaps some who do share it, or something like it, as well) as morally outrageous. Examples are not hard to find, and the sheer apparent heartlessness of such statements has undoubtedly done much to damage the moral standing of the doctrine in the eyes of many. It is not only in ancient spiritual or legal texts that, for example, people afflicted by oppression and poverty or who have physical or intellectual impairments are declared to be suffering the consequences of their own former sins; 26 such declarations are also heard in the contemporary world, often to the exasperation and dismay of campaigners against social discrimination who perceive them as throwbacks to a 'pre-modern' or 'medieval' era.
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In some instances, it seems almost as though the believer in karma has, under sceptical questioning, been pushed into a corner; she supposes that her belief system must have the resources to account for all apparent injustices and instances of pain and misery, and this supposition prompts her to make speculative assertions that more careful moral reflection might have guarded against. An instance of this sort occurs in an interview with a Tibetan Buddhist tulku named Lati Rimpoche (a 'tulku' being a high spiritual preceptor who has been recognized as the reincarnation of a previous master). 28 Some would say that, whether one knows about the history of a group of people or not, speculating that they, either individually or collectively, 'must have done something very bad' to deserve becoming victims of a genocidal regime hardly exemplifies kindness. Indeed, some would say that it 'is nothing but adding insult to injury' (Kuppuswamy 1977Ś 44) , the raising of 'the "blame the victim" idea into a systematic principle' (Kaufman 2007Ś 559 In reply, perhaps surprisingly, Kaufman turns the problem into one of numbersŚ 'it is simply implausible that so many people could have been so evil ' (2007Ś 557) . By putting it in these terms, Kaufman implies that a world containing fewer instances of suffering than ours would be one in which it were easier to accept that, even in its most extreme forms, suffering is invariably deserved. An alternative response, and one that is already suggested in Kaufman's initial essay, would be to question how certain modes of suffering could figure in any system of justice, whether human, divine or cosmic. 31 A response of this latter kind would be indicative of a deep moral disagreement between the participants in the dispute.
The capacity to see the condition of someone who has been crushed by intolerable afflictions as just retribution for something she 'must' have done in a previous life is a mode of perception that others will not share. It involves seeing the person in a different light from that in which she would be seen by someone who never associates suffering with natural or divine retribution in this way.
Invoking the notion of the law of karma as merely an aspect of the natural cosmic order, the believer in karma may deny that her own perception of the situation entails any moral disapproval or blame. From this perspective, declaring that victims of persecution must have acted badly in previous lives is simply a matter of stating the facts. Furthermore, she might 15 add, perceiving people in this way need have no direct bearing on how one behaves towards them: benevolent action may be the appropriate response, regardless of the aetiology of their condition. Those who do not accept the belief, meanwhile, might struggle to see how perceiving someone as responsible for her own misfortune could fail to be, in itself, a form of moral evaluation. Indeed, they might say, the very assumption that designating someone as deserving of her mistreatment could constitute a non-evaluative description displays a kind of moral obtuseness -an ignorance of the extent to which such descriptions are imbued with evaluative connotations. From this point of view, even if the believer in karma actively strives to alleviate the victim's suffering, the moral character of the act will not be separable from the mode of perception. It will, in other words, remain an act of assisting someone who is assumed to have brought the trouble on herself, as opposed to an act of assisting an innocent (though that difference need not, in itself, entail one or the other act's being construed as straightforwardly 'better' or 'worse'). 
Oneself and Others
Apologists for an emphatically retributive conception of karma are often willing to 'bite the bullet' with respect to the charge that it involves blaming victims for the misfortunes they experience; the doctrine does blame the victims, they admit, but not unfairly so, for the 'victims' are themselves the guilty onesŚ 'Our misery and happiness are in exact proportion to our wickedness and virtue' (Nayak 1993: 59) . The doctrine is saved from fatalism and cruelty, it will be added, due to its vehement rejection of passivity in the face of affliction. As one prominent western defender of Buddhism has put it, 'even if all deserve their suffering, in that they have caused it, there is no excuse for callous indifference to their suffering by those more "fortunate"' (Humphreys 1983Ś 38-9) . While critics may see the callousness in the very willingness to regard the suffering as deserved, defenders seek to shift the focus of discussion towards the doctrine's implications for remedial action.
Looking back to the early teachings of Buddhism, Bhikkhu Bodhi reports that, without claiming belief in karma and rebirth to be the foundation of ethics, the Buddha had emphasized its role as 'a strong inducement to moral behavior ' (2005Ś 3) . Spelling out what he means, Bodhi observes that recognizing the potential of 'our good and bad actions' to 'rebound upon ourselves, determining our future lives and bringing us happiness or suffering,' affords 'us a decisive reason to avoid unwholesome conduct and to diligently pursue the good' (ibid.). 33 Again, from an alternative moral perspective, one may feel perturbed that this purportedly 'decisive reason', far from encouraging moral behaviour, is itself decidedly unwholesome -replacing, as it does, genuinely moral motivation with unalloyed self-interest. That the desire to receive reward and escape punishment in the afterlife might have a corrupting rather than edifying effect has long been a complaint made against certain eschatologies. Why, it has been asked, should we not regard virtuous behaviour as intrinsically good, irrespective of its potential to bring happiness (Jantzen 1984: 37) ? '[S]hould we do the right because it is right,' asks Bruce Reichenbach, 'or should we do it because it is in our best interests and to our benefit?' Opting for the latter, he submits, would 'falsify the character of morality ' (1990: 137-8 1996: 14, 46 ). Yet the sentiment can resonate differently when voiced with regard to one's own situation.
Poignant examples can be found in the memoir of Ani Pachen, a Buddhist warrior-nun who was imprisoned by the Chinese regime for her part in the Tibetan uprising of the 1950s. 35 Among the many instances of torture she describes is one in which, under interrogation, Pachen was subjected to a merciless whipping with wet willow sticks by prison guards. 'Before they reached me I felt the drops of water flicking off the sticks', she writes. This harrowing passage exemplifies the profound insight that we gain from Pachen's memoir into the religious sensibility that informs her perspective on life and the world. Under conditions of intense physical and psychological abuse, the thoughts that come to her mind are not coloured by hatred or resentment. Initially she recites a mantra, venerating the 'jewellotus' (ma i-padme), traditionally associated with Avalokite vara, the 'Bodhisattva of compassion' (Lopez 1988Ś 7ś 1998Ś ch. 4) . She also invokes Guru Rinpoche ('Precious Master'), the common Tibetan name for Padmasambhava, who is popularly revered for having converted Tibet 'into a realm of Dharma' (Lin 2003Ś 150) . 36 But there is no sign of self-pity in Pachen's accountś while taking responsibility for her situation by referring to her past karma, she views the trauma that she is undergoing as a kind of purification. 37 Elsewhere, Pachen prays that her own tribulations may relieve those of others (2001: 243). Praying also that the sins of her persecutors, including Chairman Mao himself, may be 'cleared', she attributes their egregious behaviour to their own former karma (256). 38 The relationship is complex between these different strands of belief -the belief, for example, that both the suffering of the persecuted and the brutality of the persecutor can somehow be consequences of the respective individuals' past-life actions. When abstracted from the life in which they are expressed, these strands may appear incongruous; yet when seen in the context of the life as a whole, they coherently mesh together -it is in the life that we see their intelligibility.
The respective passages from Lati Rimpoche and Ani Pachen exemplify two ways of inheriting and articulating the doctrine of karma as it obtains within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. There is, on the face of it, no contradiction between themŚ holding one's own suffering to be a result of one's past actions is not merely consistent with holding the sufferings of others to be results of their past actions, but is internally related to it -another aspect of the same belief. However, the infusion of Pachen's words with self-effacing goodwill towards her fellow sufferers, combined with her acknowledgements that committing evil is itself a kind of misfortune (the most serious misfortune of all), strikes a moral tone that is not evident in Lati Rimpoche's confident assertions concerning the victims of Nazi tyranny and the 'Tibetans who were left behind'. One way of capturing the difference would be to say that, while the mode of expression exemplified in the passages from Lati Rimpoche exhibits a 19 cold detachment in the face of others' suffering, that exemplified by Pachen wears compassion on its face.
Conclusions
The suggestions I have made in the preceding section concerning different forms -or at least different emphases -that the doctrine of karma can take are really only a beginning. A fuller treatment of these issues would have to pay attention also to the many ways in which the doctrine has been amended and re-envisioned during recent times, incorporating themes and tropes from evolutionary biology for example. 39 I hope, however, enough has been said to indicate that the moral implications of the karma doctrine are not a simple matter and that the question whether, as Weber maintained, 'it represents the most consistent theodicy ever produced by history' is not one that can be answered with a straightforward affirmation or denial.
Many believers in the law of karma claim to find it consoling. They regard it as contributing to a conception of a 'law-abiding' universe, 'so constructed as to sustain moral values and uphold them' (Rao 1967Ś 139) . Critics have accused the makers of such claims of proceeding by means of counter-inductive reasoning -of inferring from the fact that the universe has been patently inequitable in the past that it will or must be supremely just in the long run. Such reasoning, Edwards complains, is 'utterly perverse' (1996Ś 33) . What may be perverse, however, is the assumption that belief in karma has anything to do with inductive reasoning. The conviction that the universe is ultimately just is based neither on inductive nor on counter-inductive reasoning; rather, it is better characterized as a metaphysical-cumethical vision, constitutive of a worldview within which the believer struggles to make sense of the phenomena of good and evil, joy and suffering, that she encounters from day to day. 20 Edwards is perhaps right to point out that the doctrine of karma, in itself, provides no practical moral guidance. It would, for example, be impossible to predict how someone will respond -or even how she would think she ought to respond -in a given morally pressing situation merely on the basis of knowing that she believes in karma; the possibilities are legion, and multiple other factors are liable to come into play. But this is, in large part, because the doctrine is not a normative ethical theory; it is one of a variety of cultural and religious elements that together provide believers with a rich conceptual palette by means of which to articulate their responses to a radically unpredictable and often apparently hostile world. It has, as Kaufman points out, been treated by many recent exponents as an explanatory theory; but even then, it is rarely presumed to offer precise moral guidance independently of culturally imbibed conceptions of duty.
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Those who have no place in their lives for the belief in karma may wonder how anyone, faced with personal tragedy, could find it the least bit comforting to suppose the pain one is undergoing to be a result of things done in a previous life; they may, moreover, be appalled by the implications of this belief when applied to the tragedies of others. If such a belief is 'rational', one might suppose, then the form of rationality it embodies is one devoid of due empathetic concern. Nevertheless, the hope that virtue must in the end be aligned with happiness is one that has reverberated throughout human history, stimulating the reflections of many great philosophers. 41 If, under analysis, that hope appears forlorn or even morally corrupting, its persistence remains, at least, understandable.
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